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The most pervasive challenge facing any national security apparatus involves identifying the range of threats the nation currently faces, predicting future threat models and preparing to confront both current and future threats. Effectively countering these threats requires investing in equipment, systems and, principally, personnel. Investing in people includes assigning specialities in the appropriate mixtures, organizing to maximize the complementary nature of those specialties, and educating those personnel. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), including the Marine Corps, has identified the most significant present and future threats to U.S. national security as those involving fourth generation warfare (4GW).
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In light of the anticipated future threats, the Marine Corps intelligence community needs to increase its manning while reorganizing itself and broadening intelligence Marines' educations if the Marine Corps intelligence community is to be relevant in confronting these threats. 1 Modern history of warfare has been divided by some theorists into "generations" intended to demarcate significant evolutions in the way wars are fought. The first generation began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and involved line and column tactics. Second generation warfare was developed during World War I and sought victory through centrally controlled, synchronized, massed firepower. Third generation warfare, or manuever warfare, uses speed, surprise, and mental and physical dislocation of an enemy's military forces to achieve a decision. Fourth generation warfare marks a departure from the first three generations in that it is a return to the style of warfare that pre-dated the rise of strong states when "many entities, not just governments of states, will wage war…for different reasons." [William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," Lew Rockwell. http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind3b.html (accessed November 26, 2008) .]
BACKGROUND
To understand how the Marine Corps intelligence community needs to transition, it's important to identify the threat that it should be designed to confront. As globalization continues, the shift to 4GW will provide both state and non-state actors with a relatively inexpensive means of challenging established authority and regional and global powers. Fourth generation warfare will become predominant as international power becomes distributed amongst several entities, as the likelihood of conflict between states and cultural/religious groups over scarce resources increases, and as criminal and terrorist organizations expand their influence.
2
Nations competing with the U.S. for influence will use 4GW to limit U.S. conventional forces' freedom of manuever both prior to and during conventional operations, 3 just as Iran has been using 4GW in Iraq to limit U.S. options in the Middle East.
4
The ability to identify and exploit a foe's tactical, operational and, ultimately, strategic vulnerabilities determines the outcome of any conflict. Due to its focus on physically defeating enemy forces, conventional warfare - 
MANPOWER
In 2005, the Corps announced a force structure increase that included plans to increase the number of its intelligence personnel. The human intelligence (HUMINT) and all-source analysis fields will experience the most significant growth.
Additionally, the increase provides some growth in language and cultural expertise. While the planned increase is a significant step forward in rectifying the personnel shortage, it falls short of what it is needed to succeed on a 4GW battlefield.
More Analysts, Linguists & Cultural Experts
The distributed nature of 4GW dictates that maneuver companies, sometimes even platoons and squads, operate independently of their parent headquarters. These distributed operations require each independent element to be supported by co-located intelligence analysts focused on processing locally collected information about the local human networks being exploited by a 4GW opponent. Creating company level intelligence cells (CLIC) has become a proven means of providing intelligence support to these independent elements. The increased force structure provides enough all-source analysts to the battalion S-2 to allow it both to function and augment the CLICs without drawing personnel from the battalion into the S-2. However, it continues to leave the CLICs predominantly manned by infantrymen.
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The battalion intelligence sections need to grow sufficiently to man the CLICs with predominantly all-source analysts. Coupled with an experienced, all-source NCO's leadership, the analysts would bring a greater intelligence capability and increased continuity to the CLICs and return the infantrymen to their normal duties. The CLICs should be composed of 5-6 personnel -a chief (an all-source NCO), two collections personnel (at least one all-source analyst) and three all-source analysts focused on intelligence analysis and production. [Ibid.] collection sites and the consolidated processing sites must include Marines capable of translating the collected information so that it may be used by analysts. The Corps needs to increase its number of Marine linguists to support sustained, continuous (24/7) operations conducted by tactical COMINT collection teams and consolidated processing points.
In addition to understanding an opponent's communications, a sound understanding of the culture in which the threat operates is imperative to successful intelligence gathering and analysis. 
Increased HUMINT Personnel
Of particular importance, the number of HUMINT personnel must be increased to enable intelligence operations to penetrate the human networks and the social terrain relied upon by 4GW However, the reconnaissance battalions should remain within the divisions for similiarity of training and integration with the MAGTF element they will most frequently support. Likewise, the VMUs 23 should remain within their respective air wings.
At first glance, the idea of forming an intelligence regiment may appear counter-intuitive when organizing for the distributed 4GW battlefield. However, it brings several advantages that make it well suited to counter 3GW and 4GW 
CONCLUSION
The most significant threat the Marine Corps must prepare to confront is one involving 4GW in dispersed, remote areas.
While the Marine Corps could be a 3GW force that defeats a 4GW opponent, history demonstrates that this would be very difficult and that the Corps should prepare for 4GW conflicts instead. If it is to be "most prepared when the nation is least prepared,"
the Marine Corps must increase its investment in its intelligence personnel. Specifically, the Corps must increase its manning, re-organize its intelligence capabilities in a manner that ensures unity of effort across the MAGTF, and educate its Marines through broader experiences and development of their congitive abilities.
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